Dialectical Materialism Revisited: Evolution, Revolution, and Misinterpretation

INTRODUCTION

Dialectical materialism can be broken down into its respective components for a clearer understanding. Dialectics describes the scientific method Marxists use to analyse the world around them. Materialism represents the Marxist conception of the reality that dialectics is intended to examine.

 

Dialectics, as a method of analysis, takes into account the interconnectedness of nature, the contradictions and the state of continuous change inherent in it, and the process by which natural quantitative change leads to qualitative change. Simply put, dialectics holds that all things are in a constant state of change, that this continual change arises through interactions and conflicts, and that many small hidden changes accumulate until the thing in question is qualitatively transformed into something different.

 

The process by which water is transformed into steam, by heating it until it passes the boiling point, illustrates the concept of dialectics at work.

 

This understanding of development and change refutes the argument that class society is based on natural human greed. The development of class society came from the material interactions and conflicts that humans have faced throughout history.

 

A belief in dialectical materialism does not validate the oppression and exploitation of the working masses within this development of class society. Marxists argue that this scientific view analyses how humanity and society have developed so that they can be changed. Most importantly, it instils the knowledge of human agency in history — that people are in fact able to change the oppressive society they live in, and that society cannot possibly remain the same as the material world changes.

 

Materialism is the Marxist conception of nature as it exists without any supernatural or mystical dimension. Materialism holds that objective reality exists independently of human consciousness and that matter is primary.

 

Dialectical materialism shows that people’s thoughts, characters and actions are shaped by the conditions of the material world around them. When people look at the world through the lens of dialectical materialism, they can see the logical development of beliefs and thoughts, actions and events, and even human history as a whole.

 

Dialectical materialism implies that capitalism, like everything else, has a birth, a development, and will eventually have an end.

 

INTRODUCTION TO MARXISM

Marxism is the name given to the body of ideas first developed by Karl Marx (1818–1883) and Friedrich Engels (1820–1895). It is a conflict theory which argues that society is divided by struggle between different groups. The way society produces the things we need — the mode of production — exploits the proletariat because the bourgeoisie (the ruling class) benefit from the labour of the working class.

 

Taken as a whole, these ideas provide a fully worked-out theoretical basis for the struggle of the working class to achieve a higher form of human society: socialism.

 

The study of Marxism falls under three main headings, corresponding broadly to philosophy, social history, and economics: Dialectical Materialism, Historical Materialism, and Marxist Economics. These are often described as the “three component parts of Marxism”.

 

Dialectical materialism is the world outlook of the Marxist-Leninist movement. It is called dialectical materialism because its method of studying and understanding the phenomena of nature is dialectical, while its interpretation of those phenomena — its conception and theory — is materialist.

 

Historical materialism is the extension of the principles of dialectical materialism to the study of social life. It applies those principles to the phenomena of society, to the study of social structures, and to their historical development.

 

Marxian economics focuses on the role of labour in the development of the economy. It argues that the specialisation of the labour force, combined with a growing population, drives wages down, and that the value placed on goods and services does not accurately account for the true cost of labour.

 

COMMON MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT MARXISM

 

MISCONCEPTION 1: MARXISM LEADS TO TOTALITARIANISM

This shows a fundamental misunderstanding of Marxist principles. In true communism, the government fades into the background, as societal needs are met largely through local efforts. Communism evolves out of a socialist system, which is in large part organised by a small government run by politicians who represent people instead of business interests.

 

Marxism, however, has often been hijacked by thugs and opportunists seeking to aggrandise and enrich themselves during this socialist stage. It has been used as an excuse by individuals to take over an entire country’s economy in the name of Marxism.

 

MISCONCEPTION 2: MARXISM LEADS TO LAZINESS

Today, people work themselves to the bone to enrich others. They are willing to work far more than 40 hours a week for businesses run by individuals who personally produce nothing, yet earn many times more than their average employees. If people work so hard to enrich others, they will work just as hard if they are working to enrich themselves. One problem with nationwide socialist systems is that an individual’s hard work represents only a tiny percentage of the overall output. If one works harder, he or she does not immediately see the effects. In true communism, however, that productivity is enjoyed at the local level; working harder leads to local and tangible improvement.

 

The Oxford English Dictionary was created and developed through the voluntary submission of words. Even the arts and entertainment can flourish without a profit incentive. Many artists, actors, and writers pursue their passions regardless of monetary success. The point is that quality products and services can be produced without the need for personal wealth enrichment. When one’s needs are met communally, he or she can still be a productive member of society. Studies show that if a person is personally fulfilled by their profession, wages are not the decisive factor in their overall life satisfaction.

 

Some may argue that certain jobs will not attract enough people to fill them—for example, few may wish to become sewer rat exterminators. While there will always be some who genuinely enjoy such tasks, incentives can be offered to offset the unpleasantness of particular jobs, such as a reduced workload. The real difficulty lies in removing the social stigma from certain roles. A reduced workload for the most undesirable tasks may gradually shift society’s perception of them.

 

MISCONCEPTION 3: MARXISM IS ANTI-RELIGION

Marxism is for equality among all people. Religion has often been used to divide people of different faiths, but also to perpetuate laws that justify the rule of the social elite over the many. Technically speaking, Marxism does not require the renunciation of religion. However, if religion is used as a tool to oppress and divide people, then it is incompatible not only with Marxism but with any movement that truly values equality for all, not just for those favoured within a chosen belief system.

 

Marx famously called religion the “opiate of the people,” referring to the way in which it was used to pacify populations into accepting the often-oppressive rule of others.

 

WHAT IS DIALETICAL MATERIALISM?

The term dialectical materialism is originally credited to the Russian revolutionary and social philosopher Georgi Valentinovich Plekhanov (1857–1918).

 

Dialectical materialism is the method of logical ideals used by Hegel and later adapted by Karl Marx to observable social and economic processes. It is based on the principle that an idea or event (thesis) generates its opposite (antithesis), leading to a reconciliation of opposites. Taking this further, and differing from Hegel, Marx stated of his own method that “the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind and translated into forms of thought.”

 

It examines the subjects of the world in relation to each other within a dynamic, evolutionary environment, in contrast to metaphysical materialism, which studies parts of the world in a static, isolated way. It is called dialectical materialism because its approach to the phenomena of nature—its method of studying and apprehending them—is dialectical, while its interpretation and conception of these phenomena is materialistic.

 

The term dialectics comes from the Greek dialego, meaning “to discourse” or “to debate.” In ancient times, dialectics was the art of arriving at truth by disclosing contradictions in an opponent’s argument and overcoming them. Philosophers of the ancient world believed that the revelation of contradictions in thought, and the clash of opposing opinions, was the best method of arriving at truth.

 

This dialectical method of thought, later extended to the phenomena of nature, developed into the dialectical method of apprehending nature itself. It regards natural phenomena as being in constant motion and undergoing continuous change, with development arising from contradictions within nature and from the interaction of opposing forces.

 

In essence, dialectics is the direct opposite of metaphysics. Dialectical materialism recognises the evolution of the natural world and the emergence of new qualities of being at new stages of evolution.

 

Dialectics and Metaphysics

The Marxist view of the world is not only materialist, but also dialectical. For its critics, the dialectic is portrayed as something totally mystical, and therefore irrelevant. But this is certainly not the case. The dialectical method is simply an attempt to understand more clearly our real, interdependent world. Dialectics, states Engels, “is nothing more than the science of the general laws of motion and development of nature, human society and thought.” Put simply, it is the logic of motion.

 

It is obvious to most people that we do not live in a static world. In fact, everything in nature is in a state of constant change. “Motion is the mode of existence of matter,” states Engels. “Never anywhere has there been matter without motion, nor can there be.” The earth revolves continually around its axis, and in turn revolves around the sun. This results in day and night, and the different seasons that we experience throughout the year. We are born, grow up, grow old and eventually die. Everything is moving, changing, either rising and developing or declining and dying away. Any equilibrium is only relative and only has meaning in relation to other forms of motion.

 

“When we consider and reflect upon nature at large or the history of mankind or our own intellectual activity, at first we see the picture of an endless entanglement of relations and reactions, permutations and combinations, in which nothing remains what, where, and as it was, but everything moves, changes, comes into being, and passes away,” remarks Engels. “We see, therefore, at first the picture as a whole, with its individual parts still more or less kept in the background; we observe the movements, transitions, connections rather than the things that move, combine, and are connected. This primitive, naïve but intrinsically correct conception of the world is that of ancient Greek philosophy and was first clearly formulated by Heraclitus: everything is and is not, for everything is fluid, is constantly changing, constantly coming into being and passing away.”

 

The Greeks made a whole series of revolutionary discoveries and advances in natural science. Anaximander made a map of the world and wrote a book on cosmology, from which only a few fragments survive. The Antikythera mechanism, as it is called, appears to be the remains of a clockwork planetarium dating back to the first century BC. Given the limited knowledge of the time, many were anticipations and inspired guesses. Under slave society, these brilliant inventions could not be put to productive use and were regarded simply as playthings for amusement. The real advances in natural science took place in the mid‑fifteenth century.

 

The new methods of investigation meant the division of nature into its individual parts, allowing objects and processes to be classified. While this provided a massive amount of data, objects were analysed in isolation and not in their living environment. This produced a narrow, rigid, metaphysical mode of thought that has become the hallmark of empiricism. “The facts” became the all‑important feature. Facts alone are wanted in life.

 

“To the metaphysician things and their mental reflexes, ideas, are isolated, are to be considered one after the other and apart from each other, are objects of investigation fixed, rigid, given once and for all,” states Engels. “He thinks in absolutely irreconcilable antitheses. His communication is ‘yea, yea; nay, nay’; for whatsoever is more than this cometh of evil. For him a thing either exists or does not exist; a thing cannot at the same time be itself and something else. Positive and negative absolutely exclude one another; cause and effect stand in rigid antithesis to one another.”

 

“At first sight this mode of thinking seems to us very luminous, because it is that of so‑called sound common sense. Only sound common sense, respectable fellow that he is, in the homely realm of his own four walls, has very wonderful adventures directly he ventures out into the wide world of research. And the metaphysical mode of thought, justifiable and necessary as it is in a number of domains whose extent varies according to the nature of the particular object of investigation, sooner or later reaches a limit beyond which it becomes one‑sided, restricted, abstract, lost in insoluble contradictions. In the contemplation of individual things it forgets the connection between them; in the contemplation of their existence it forgets the beginning and the end of that existence; of their repose, it forgets their motion. It cannot see the wood for the trees.”

 

Engels goes on to explain that for everyday purposes we know whether an animal is alive or not. But upon closer examination we are forced to recognise that this is not a simple, straightforward question. On the contrary, it is a complex question. There are raging debates even today as to when life begins in the mother’s womb. Likewise, it is just as difficult to say when the exact moment of death occurs, as physiology proves that death is not a single instantaneous act, but a protracted process. In the brilliant words of the Greek philosopher Heraclitus, “It is the same thing in us that is living and dead, asleep and awake, young and old; each changes place and becomes the other. We step and we do not step into the same stream; we are, and we are not.”

 

Not everything is as it appears on the surface of things. Every species, every aspect of organic life, is at every moment the same and not the same. It develops by assimilating matter from without and simultaneously discarding other unwanted matter; continually some cells die while others are renewed. Over time, the body is completely transformed, renewed from top to bottom. Therefore, every organic entity is both itself and yet something other than itself.

 

This phenomenon cannot be explained by metaphysical thought or formal logic. This approach is incapable of explaining contradiction. This contradictory reality does not enter the realm of common‑sense reasoning. Dialectics, on the other hand, comprehends things in their connection, development, and motion. As far as Engels was concerned, “Nature is the proof of dialectics.”

 

“Matter moves in an eternal cycle, completing its trajectory in a period so vast that in comparison with it our earthly year is as nothing; in a cycle in which the period of highest development, namely the period of organic life with its crowning achievement — self‑consciousness — is a space just as comparatively minute in the history of life and self‑consciousness; in a cycle in which every particular form of the existence of matter — be it the sun or a nebula, a particular animal or animal species, a chemical combination or decomposition — is equally in transition; in a cycle in which nothing is eternal, except eternally changing, eternally moving matter and the laws of its movement and change.

 

But however often and pitilessly this cycle may be accomplished in time and space, however many countless suns and earths may arise and fall, however long it may be necessary to wait until in some solar system, on some planet, conditions suitable for organic life appear, however many countless beings may fall and rise before, out of their midst, animals with a thinking brain develop that find an environment that permits them to live, be it even only for a short period, we are, nevertheless, assured that matter in all its changes remains eternally one and the same, that not one of its attributes may perish, and that that same iron necessity which compels the destruction of the highest early bloom of matter — the thinking spirit — also necessitates its rebirth at some other place, at some other time.”

 

“Changes in being consist not only in the fact that one quantity passes into another quantity, but also that quality passes into quantity, and vice versa,” wrote Hegel. “Each transition of the latter kind represents an interruption, and gives the phenomenon a new aspect, qualitatively distinct from the previous one. Thus water when cooled grows hard, not gradually… but all at once; having already cooled to freezing‑point, it can still remain a liquid only if it preserves a tranquil condition, and then the slightest shock is sufficient for it suddenly to become hard.

 

In the world of moral phenomena, there take place the same changes of quantitative into qualitative, and differences in qualities there also are founded upon quantitative differences. Thus, a little less, a little more, constitutes that limit beyond which frivolity ceases and there appears something quite different: crime.”

 

Mаtеriаliѕm vеrѕuѕ idealism

“Thе philosophy оf Mаrxiѕm iѕ materialism,” states Lenin. Philosophy itself falls into two great ideological camps: materialism and idealism. Before we proceed, even these terms need explanation. To begin with, materialism and idealism have nothing in common with their everyday usage, where materialism is associated with material greed and swindling (in short, the morality of present-day capitalism) and idealism with high ideals and virtue. Far from it!

 

Philosophical materialism is the outlook which explains that there is only one material world. There is no Heaven or Hell. The universe, which has always existed and is not the creation of any supernatural being, is in the process of constant flux. Human beings are part of nature and evolved from lower forms of life, whose origins sprang from a lifeless planet some 3.6 billion years ago.

 

With the evolution of life, at a certain stage came the development of animals with a nervous system, and eventually human beings with a large brain. With humans emerged human thought and consciousness. The human brain alone is capable of producing general ideas, i.e. thinking. Therefore matter, which existed eternally, existed and still exists independently of the mind and human beings. Things existed long before any awareness of them arose or could have arisen on the part of living organisms.

 

For materialists there is no consciousness apart from the living brain, which is part of a material body. A mind without a body is an absurdity. Matter is not a product of mind, but mind itself is the highest product of matter. Ideas are simply a reflection of the independent material world that surrounds us. Things reflected in a mirror do not depend on this reflection for their existence. “All ideas are taken from experience, are reflections – true or distorted – of reality,” states Engels. Or, to use the words of Marx, “Life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life.”

 

Marxists do not deny that mind, consciousness, thought, will, feeling or sensation is real. What materialists deny is that the thing called “the mind” exists separately from the body. Mind is not distinct from the body. Thinking is the product of the brain, which is the organ of thought.

 

Yet this does not mean that our consciousness is a lifeless mirror of nature. Human beings relate to their surroundings; they are aware of their surroundings and react accordingly; in turn, the environment reacts back upon them. While rooted in material conditions, human beings generalise and think creatively. They in turn change their material surroundings.

 

On the other hand, philosophical idealism states that the material world is not real but is simply the reflection of the world of ideas. There are different forms of idealism, but all essentially explain that ideas are primary and matter, if it exists at all, is secondary. For the idealists, ideas are dissevered from matter, from nature. This is Hegel’s conception of the Absolute Idea, or what amounts to God. Philosophical idealism opens the road, in one way or another, to the defence of or support for religion and superstition. Not only is this outlook false, it is also profoundly conservative, leading us to the pessimistic conclusion that we can never understand the “mysterious ways” of the world. Whereas materialism understands that human beings not only observe the real world, but can change it, and in doing so, change themselves.

 

The idealist view of the world grew out of the division of labour between physical and mental labour. This division constituted an enormous advance as it freed a section of society from physical work and allowed them the time to develop science and technology. However, the further removed from physical labour, the more abstract their ideas became. And when thinkers separate their ideas from the real world, they become increasingly consumed by abstract “pure thought” and end up with all types of fantasies. Today, cosmology is dominated by complex abstract mathematical conceptions, which have led to all sorts of weird and wonderful erroneous theories: the Big Bang, the beginning of time, parallel universes, etc. Every break with practice leads to a one-sided idealism.

 

The materialist outlook has a long history stretching back to the ancient Greeks of Anaxagoras (c.500–428 BC) and Democritus (c.460–c.370 BC). With the collapse of Ancient Greece, this rational outlook was cut across for a whole historical epoch, and only after the reawakening of thought following the demise of the Christian Middle Ages was there a revival of philosophy and natural science. From the seventeenth century, the home of modern materialism was England. “The real progenitor of English materialism is Bacon,” states Marx.

 

The materialism of Francis Bacon (1561–1626) was then systematised and developed by Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679), whose ideas were in turn developed by John Locke (1632–1704). The latter already thought it possible that matter could possess the faculty of thinking. It is no accident that these advances in human thought coincided with the rise of the bourgeoisie and great advances in science, particularly mechanics, astronomy and medicine. These great thinkers in turn provided the breakthrough for the brilliant school of French materialists of the eighteenth century, most notably René Descartes (1596–1650).

 

It was their materialism and rationalism that became the creed of the Great French Revolution of 1789. These revolutionary thinkers recognised no external authority. Everything from religion to natural science, from society to political institutions, was subjected to the most searching criticism. Reason became the measure of everything.

 

LAW OF DIALETICAL MATERIALISM

Lаw оf Trаnѕfоrmаtiоn оf Quаntitаtivе tо Qualitative Chаngе:

“Dialectics, the most complete, comprehensive, and profound theory of development, is the heart and soul of Marxism-Leninism, its theoretical foundation. The universal laws of dialectics reveal the essential features of any developing phenomenon, no matter to what field of activity it may belong.” Dialectical materialism does not treat nature or the universe as stable or immobile—the very concept of development lies in this notion.

 

There is a continuous struggle between opposite forces, and this struggle, according to Marx and Engels, is the key to all forms of progress. Dialectical materialism further states that change or evolution from lower to higher, from quantitative to qualitative, is never slow, gradual, or smooth. It is sudden and abrupt. The real development of society envisages such transformation.

Sheptulin remarks: “The totalities of properties that make a particular thing what it is, is called its quality. The totality of properties indicating a thing’s dimensions or magnitude is called its quantity. Dialectical materialism is not content with asserting that everything develops. The development or transformation is from quantity to quality.”

 

Now let us explain what is meant by quantitative and qualitative change. The first basic law of dialectical materialism is that transformation may be quantitative or qualitative. All change has a quantitative aspect; that is, there may be an increase or decrease of the thing. But quantitative change cannot continue indefinitely.

 

It has its limitations. After a certain point, quantitative change may turn into qualitative change. When water is heated it becomes hotter and hotter, and after some time the water is converted into vapour. This conversion of water into vapour is a qualitative change.

 

Similarly, when water is cooled and its temperature is brought down to the freezing point, the water becomes ice. The water is converted into ice, but both are not the same. Quantitative changes occur constantly and gradually.

 

What about qualitative change? Qualitative changes in a thing are the result of accumulated quantitative changes in it. So quantitative and qualitative changes in a thing are, in a sense, matters of stages. After a particular stage, quantitative change ceases. Again, qualitative change assumes the form of leaps.

 

There is a break or discontinuity which is absent in quantitative change. A leap is a form of development that occurs much quicker than continual development. A leap in development is characterised by intensity; it is truly a breakthrough. Quantitative change is gradual; qualitative change is abrupt.

 

The law states that there is an interconnection and interaction between the quantitative and qualitative aspects of an object. Small, at first imperceptible, quantitative changes accumulate gradually and sooner or later upset the proportions of that object, evoking fundamental qualitative changes that take place in the form of leaps. Their occurrence depends on the nature of the objects in question and the conditions of their development in diverse forms. Knowledge of this law is vital to understanding development.

 

It provides a guideline for examining and studying phenomena as the unity of their qualitative and quantitative aspects, for seeing the complex interconnections and interactions of these aspects, and for analysing the changes in the relationships between them.

 

Engels borrowed the concept of quantitative–qualitative change from science and applied it to society. With the rapid growth of industrial capitalism, wealth in the form of money is accumulated in the hands of a few, while the number of propertyless proletarians rises steadily. When enough people have been proletarianised to make capitalism mature, quantitative change gives rise to qualitative change.

 

Lаw of Unitу аnd Strugglеѕ of Oрроѕitеѕ:

Sheptulin defines opposites and contradictions in the following words:

 

“Aspects in which changes move in opposite directions and which have opposite trends of functioning and development are called opposites, while the interaction of these aspects constitutes a contradiction.”

 

Every phenomenon is characterised by certain opposites and contradictions. This is the property of the phenomenon. For example, in capitalist society there are two antagonistic classes: bourgeoisie and proletariat.

 

The interests, objectives, and attitudes of these two classes are diametrically opposed. Yet they exist side by side, and this is due to the interdependence, interconnection, and interpenetration of opposites.

 

The opposites have different aspects of functioning and development and move in different directions of change. But despite this, the opposites do not eliminate each other; they co-exist in an unbreakable unity and interdependence. This is an interesting characteristic of all opposites. Let us illustrate the point. In all class societies, Marx and Engels have said, there are mainly two classes: proletariat and bourgeoisie, or capitalists.

 

There are conflicts and contradictions, and despite these, both classes exist side by side, and this coexistence is inevitable. One cannot exist without the other. But a situation arises when coexistence becomes absolutely impossible, and this finally leads to revolution or class struggle.

 

It has been claimed by Marx that after the revolution the proletarian class will establish its supremacy and create a classless society, which is called communism. Whether a communist society will bring about an end of contradictions is a debatable issue. But Marx and Engels have explained the matter from the standpoint of historical materialism.

 

The law of dialectics states that the struggle of opposites cannot be underestimated. Rather, it is the motive force of social development. Lenin once said, “Development is the struggle of opposites.”

 

This development or motion is self-development or self-motion. That is, the development resulting from the struggle of opposites is not caused by external forces. This motion is directly relevant to dialectical materialism. This principle of dialectics has its own laws of motion. This must be carefully remembered.

 

The contradictions are not immobile or immutable. Once they have arisen they develop and pass through definite stages. For the disappearance and replacement of contradictions two conditions must be fulfilled.

 

One is that contradictions must be fully revealed, and the other is that they must be fully developed. When these two conditions are fulfilled a situation for the leap will emerge. The old phenomenon will disappear and will be replaced by a new one, which will be qualitatively higher or better than the earlier.

 

There are two stages of this development. First, a contradiction will unfold; then it will be resolved. The contradiction first appears in the form of difference. Then this deepens into manifest contradiction.

 

In order to maximise profit, the capitalist develops his productive system. Wealth, in the form of money, is concentrated in the hands of the few. Workers are more and more proletarianised.

 

Contradictions deepen. Ultimately demand is raised for the replacement of private property by socialist property. When is such a demand made? The contradictions will arrive at a critical stage, and the struggle between the opposites will reach the ultimate point. This is the stage of resolution of contradictions. Dialectical materialism attaches a great deal of importance to the resolution of contradictions.

 

In order to explain the law of struggle of opposites, Cornforth cites an example. A cord will break when excessive load is put upon it. The qualitative change takes place as a result of the opposition set up between the tensile strength of the cord and the pull of the load.

 

Another example is when spring wheat is transformed into winter wheat. This is the result of the opposition between the plant’s “conservatism” and the changing conditions of growth and development to which it is subjected; at a certain point the influence of the latter overcomes the former.

 

The Lаw оf thе Nеgаtiоn of Nеgаtiоn:

Marx has said, “In no sphere can one undergo development without negating one’s previous mode of existence.”

 

Negation is an inevitable and logical element of development. Marx and Engels observed that a very powerful precondition of social development is the negation of previous existence.

 

Now the question arises: what is negation?

 

In ordinary consciousness, the concept of negation is associated with the word “no” — to negate means to say “no” or to reject something. But dialectical materialism views the concept from a different angle. Negation is an important element of progress, carrying a deeper meaning. According to Engels, “Negation in dialectics does not mean simply saying no, or declaring that something does not exist, or destroying in the same way one likes.”

 

In the opinion of A. P. Shertulin, “Dialectical negation is objective. It is the negation of one qualitative state and the formation of a new one. It stems from the development of the internal contradictions of a phenomenon and results from the struggle between internal opposite forces and tendencies; it is a connecting link between lower and higher.”

 

Dialectical negation is therefore an important factor of progress and development. One feature of it is that it combines the old and the new; it acts as a connection between the two. The negation of the old force by the new removes obstacles in the way of development. Yet once development appears, the new force does not stand disconnected from the old. In this way, a chain of connection continues to exist.

 

The process of negation also carries within it the potentialities of new forces. Otherwise, negation would be meaningless. It performs its function precisely because it has the ability to create something new. Lenin stated, “Not empty negation, not futile negation, not sceptical negation, vacillation and doubt is characteristic and essential in dialectics — which undoubtedly contains elements of negation, and indeed as its most important element — but negation as a movement of development, retaining the positive.”

 

The law of negation of negation is thus a law whose operation ensures the connection and continuity between that which is negated and that which negates. For this reason, dialectical negation is not a naked or “needless” rejection that denies all previous development. Instead, it is the very condition of development, retaining and preserving within itself all the progressive content of earlier stages, repeating at a higher level certain features of initial stages, and possessing in general a progressive and ascending character.

DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM AND REVOLUTION

There are a variety of theories that have been proposed to explain the changing world as we know it. Various thinkers have outlined the different ways in which the world has been transformed into a better place to live. According to Karl Marx: “The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways. The point, however, is to change it.” This introduces a new perception — the need to transform the interpretation of the world. Marx goes on to assert that in order to interpret the world, a scientific understanding of it is required so that it may be changed. Consequently, Marx and his long-term colleague Engels were searching for a scientific explanation that could accurately interpret human history and ultimate progress.

It is from this interest that Karl Marx and his colleague Frederick Engels developed Dialectical Materialism, a derivative of the Hegelian dialectic, designed to comprehend human history with a materialistic conception. While Marx credits Hegel for presenting dialectics, he criticises him for turning dialectics upside down. As Marx explains: “With Hegel, it is standing on its head. It must be turned right side up again.” Hegelian dialectics, according to Marx, places emphasis on ideas, privileging the processes of the human brain. This amounts to dialectical idealism and is therefore flawed.

Instead, Marx proposes that the material world is the true foundation — the world of production and economic activity — and that interpretation must not rely on the abstract mental world of ideas. In effect, Marx rejects the abstract and insists upon the concrete in interpreting the world. He refutes Hegel’s dialectics as “a product of the human mind which failed to interpret the material world.”

Marx’s understanding of the world is therefore grounded in relations of production, modes of production, and the ways in which societies are structured to exploit technological powers in order to effectively interact with their material surroundings. Consequently, Marx’s dialectical approach is materialistic and is popularly referred to as Dialectical Materialism. His interpretation of human history is materialistic, focused on the development of human societies over time; hence the concept of Historical Materialism.

Marx and Engels applied Hegel’s dialectic to comprehend human history, though in my perception, they did not apply it efficiently, which sometimes led to conflicting outcomes. To illustrate this, it is important to consider Frederick Engels and Lenin’s contributions. In Science of Logic, Engels described materialistic dialectics and formulated three laws of dialectics:

The law of the unity and conflict of opposites

The law of the passage of quantitative changes into qualitative changes

The law of the negation of the negation

 

The Law of the Unity and Conflict of Opposites

 

The first law of unity and conflict of opposites is quite logical. It can be perceived that it is equally prudent to have unity while at the same time a conflict of interests. In this, Marx and Engels, whether unwittingly or deliberately, proposed unity within the weak or oppressed class, replacing the unity of both opposing classes. They placed the unity of opposites on different and opposing dimensions, making them rivals. Despite this, as pointed out by the law, they should in fact be complementary. Having opposing characteristics or belonging to different social classes does not necessarily imply enmity.

 

In his essay On the Question of Dialectics, Lenin argues that “development is the struggle of opposites.” Lenin further states that “the unity (coincidence, identity, equal action) of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute.” While Lenin’s argument appears plausible, he presents only a half-truth of the law of dialectics as the unity of opposites. When he discusses proletarian revolution, he disregards the unity of opposites existing between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, and instead emphasises unity within the proletariat itself. At this point, a pertinent question arises about the position of unity as set out by Engels’ law. Additionally, where is the unity of opposites that Lenin himself stipulates as being conditional?

 

Another influential philosopher of his time, Mao, made a similar mistake. He began by criticising Stalin and the Soviet Party for allowing the union to drift into a state where institutions quickly created an atmosphere to bring societal resources under communist control and were acknowledged as having permanent and universal validity. Mao argued that this had the effect of suppressing political activity. He insisted that dialectical materialism was as applicable to socialist society as it was to the capitalist phase. In his speeches, Mao promoted this idea and pushed for full participation in development as part of a cultural revolution. For Mao, the notion of continuous revolution meant that the purpose of the Communist Party was not simply to staff an authoritarian bureaucracy but to guarantee and enable a process of development that aligned Marxism with popular aspirations, while investigating a progressive process of transformation.

 

Mao, at one time, proposed the application of dialectical materialism to the socialist stage in a manner similar to the capitalist state, though his interpretation of dialectical materialism during the Soviet Union differed in respect of workers and peasants.

 

Mao writes: “Even under the social conditions existing in the Soviet Union, there is a difference between workers and peasants, and this very difference is a contradiction. Although, unlike the contradiction between labour and capital, it will not become intensified into antagonism or assume the form of class struggle; the workers and the peasants have established a firm alliance in the course of socialist construction and are gradually resolving this contradiction in the course of the advance from socialism to communism.”

 

Here we see a sharp contradiction in Mao’s ideology. He advocates a firm alliance between classes and believes in gradually resolving the contradiction during the development of the socialist state, while at the same time his position regarding the development of socialism from capitalism is not gradual but revolutionary. He asserts: “A revolution is not a dinner party, or writing an essay, or painting a picture, or doing embroidery; it cannot be so refined, so leisurely and gentle, so temperate, kind, courteous, restrained and magnanimous. A revolution is an insurrection, an act of violence by which one class overthrows another.”

 

The Law of the Passage of Quantitative Changes into Qualitative Changes

 

The second law of dialectics is the passage of quantitative changes into qualitative changes. At first glance this appears logical, since continuous small changes in a system can eventually transform its very character. Yet the question remains whether Marx, Engels, and later Lenin and Mao applied this principle consistently.

 

For Marx and Engels, the growth of contradictions within the capitalist mode of production was seen not as a gradual balance but as a build-up of quantitative pressures that would eventually erupt into qualitative change — the proletarian revolution. The argument is persuasive in theory: the accumulation of exploitation, inequality, and class antagonisms does not remain at the level of minor adjustments but eventually bursts into a new stage of society. However, it may also be said that this presumes inevitability, overlooking historical examples where quantitative changes led instead to adaptation rather than total transformation.

 

Lenin, in his writings, takes this law as absolute. He explains that gradual changes, when reaching a threshold, inevitably give rise to a new quality. His description is powerful but also rigid, leaving little room for societies where incremental reforms have succeeded in averting revolutionary breaks. The danger here is reducing the dialectic to a mechanical formula, where every accumulation must result in rupture, ignoring the nuances of history.

 

Mao, too, applied this law to insist upon the necessity of constant revolutionary struggle. He argued that the quantitative changes in socialist society — such as growing bureaucratic privilege or widening gaps between workers and peasants — would, if unchecked, transform into qualitative degeneration back into capitalism. Hence his insistence on the “continuous revolution.” Yet this reading again highlights a paradox: while Mao emphasises gradual contradictions in socialism, he simultaneously calls for their abrupt resolution through mass movements and cultural upheaval.

 

Thus, while the law itself captures a truth — that small and continuous changes can alter the essence of a system — its application by Marxist thinkers often carried contradictions. Does every quantitative shift necessarily become a qualitative transformation? Or can systems evolve without violent rupture? The law raises as many questions as it seeks to answer, especially when tested against the complexities of real history.

The Law of the Negation of the Negation

 

The third law of dialectics, the negation of the negation, is perhaps the most contested. On paper it suggests that history and development do not simply move in a straight line, but through stages, where each new phase “negates” the previous one while still retaining certain elements of it. In other words, change is not pure destruction but a transformation that carries forward aspects of what came before.

 

For Marx, this principle was applied to history: feudalism was negated by capitalism, and capitalism, in turn, would be negated by socialism and eventually communism. Each stage contains remnants of the past, but also creates something qualitatively new. This gives history a progressive direction, even a sense of inevitability. Yet this raises the same problem as with the earlier laws: is such progression necessary, or is it simply assumed?

 

Engels, in his Anti-Dühring, strongly defended this law, presenting it almost as a natural principle evident in biology and society alike. He gave examples such as the growth of a seed into a plant, its death, and the creation of new seeds — a cycle of negation that produces continuity. While appealing, this analogy can seem simplistic, as human societies are not merely natural organisms but complex political and cultural constructs.

 

Lenin leaned heavily on this law, interpreting revolutions as the highest expression of negation. Yet his treatment often downplayed the possibility of synthesis, focusing instead on the outright overthrow of one class by another. In doing so, he risked reducing the dialectical process to a justification for perpetual revolution without adequately considering stability or gradual integration.

 

Mao’s approach was more radical still. For him, negation of the negation was not a distant historical process but a constant necessity. His idea of continuous revolution implied that every achievement of socialism had to be challenged and overturned to prevent regression. This interpretation intensified the cycle of negation, sometimes leaving little room for consolidation or measured progress.

 

Thus, while the law of the negation of the negation introduces a profound insight — that development occurs through contradiction, transformation, and renewal — its application in Marxist thought often carried contradictions of its own. Must every stage of society necessarily be overthrown? Is negation always revolutionary, or can it also be reformative? These questions remain open, suggesting that while the law is powerful as a lens, it is far less absolute than its early defenders claimed.

 

MARX’S DIALETICAL MATERIALISM

Marx’s writings are almost exclusively concerned with understanding human history in terms of systemic processes, based on modes of production, that is, the ways in which societies organise themselves to employ their technological powers in interaction with their material surroundings. This framework is known as historical materialism. Within this general theory of history, much of Marx’s work is devoted to the analysis of the specific structure and development of the capitalist economy.

 

The concept of dialectical materialism emerges from Marx’s statements in the postface to his Capital, where he explicitly acknowledges his debt to Hegel. Marx defended Hegel against those who dismissed him as a “dead dog,” declaring himself openly as a pupil of the German philosopher. He credited Hegel with being the first to present dialectics in a comprehensive and self-conscious manner. Yet Marx was critical of Hegel’s approach, arguing that Hegel had turned dialectics “upside down.” For Marx, dialectics had to be set “right side up” in order to uncover its rational core beneath the mystical shell.

 

The central criticism Marx made of Hegel was that Hegel’s dialectics dealt primarily with ideas and with the workings of the human mind. Hegel’s dialectical system concerned itself with the process of thought, often referred to as dialectical idealism, a hallmark of the German idealist tradition. Marx, by contrast, argued that dialectics must deal with the material world rather than the mental world of ideas. His focus lay on production and economic activity as the true drivers of historical development.

 

Marx was particularly critical of interpretations of history that imposed neat, predetermined patterns on the course of events. He rejected the view of some of Hegel’s followers who saw history as if it were a metaphysical subject, independent of individuals, towards which all previous social formations had somehow been aiming. To interpret history in this teleological manner, he argued, was to misunderstand the real historical movement whereby each generation transforms the outcomes inherited from its predecessors. His rejection of such teleology was one of the reasons he so warmly, though not uncritically, embraced Darwin’s theory of natural selection, which also explained development through concrete processes rather than predetermined ends.

 

For Marx, dialectics was not a formula for producing fixed outcomes but a method for empirical study. It provided a way to understand social processes in terms of interrelations, development, and transformation.

 

Nevertheless, while Marx emphasised that human beings are natural entities embedded in an evolving relationship with the rest of nature, his own writings did not fully explore the constraints imposed by biology, geography, and ecology. This gap has left later thinkers to question how far Marx’s materialism accounted for the natural conditions that shape and limit human activity.

 

MARX’S VIEW ON POLITICS

 

Karl Marx (1818–1883) is undoubtedly one of the most important and influential thinkers of the modern period. Yet, although much of what he wrote has been sedimented into contemporary culture, many of his ideas—particularly his political ones—remain far too radical ever to be fully absorbed into academic common sense. This is partly because his legacy has consistently been attacked and misrepresented by those aligned with the opposing side of social struggle. At a deeper level, however, academic misunderstanding of Marx’s thought arises from a structural gap between his totalising methodology and academia’s tendency to fragment knowledge into disciplines and sub-disciplines.

 

Because Marx’s work marks a decisive break with such fragmentation, any attempt to map his ideas neatly onto the categories of modern academic thought is fraught with difficulty. The profoundly historical and revolutionary nature of his thought makes it almost unintelligible from the essentially static perspective of contemporary theory. Modern theory does recognise change, but usually within reformist limits: change is conceived as taking place inside the boundaries established by naturalised capitalist social relations. Any attempt to frame Marx’s thought as a political theory in the conventional sense must therefore confront the fact that it cannot be fully contained within this standpoint. Marx was neither economist, sociologist, nor political theorist in the usual sense. Rather, his revolutionary theory involved the sublation of these categories into a larger, unified whole.

 

Thus, while Marx’s writings undoubtedly contain economic, political, and sociological dimensions, they cannot be reduced to a mixture of these fields. Critics should resist the temptation to force aspects of his work into one or another academic sub-discipline, or to interpret his conception of totality as a simple form of interdisciplinarity. Modern political theory, for instance, tends to treat politics as a universal feature of human life. Marx, by contrast, saw it as a historical phenomenon. States, law, and ideology were, in his analysis, superstructural forms that functioned to stabilise and reproduce minority rule in class-divided societies. From this perspective, politics is not a timeless human condition but an epiphenomenon of relations of production, a means by which one class maintains control over humanity’s productive engagement with nature. It has an origin in the rise of class societies, a hoped-for end in the communist “closure” of humanity’s pre-history, and can only truly be understood by those actively engaged in the struggle to transcend the conditions that make it necessary.

 

Marx’s Theory of Political Behaviour

 

Marxism is concerned with the politics of class: the success or failure of working-class organisational efforts, the occurrence of collective action in defence of class interests, the logic of working-class electoral politics, and the occurrence of revolution. Marx attempted to analyse and explain a variety of political phenomena—for example, the forms that working-class political action took in 1848 in France, the reasons for Napoleon III’s overwhelming electoral victory in 1849, and the efforts by organisations of the English working class to achieve the Ten Hours Bill.

 

What assumptions underlie Marx’s analysis of the political behaviour of class? His theory comes down to three elements: a theory of individual means–end rationality, a theory of ideology, and a theory of class consciousness.

 

There is much in common between Marxism and the rational choice model of political behaviour (so does Adam Przeworski in Capitalism and Social Democracy). The rational-choice approach postulates that individuals’ political behaviour is a calculated attempt to further a given set of interests—income, security, prestige, office, etc. One might suppose that such an approach is unavoidably bourgeois, depending upon the materialistic egoism characteristic of market society. Marx’s theory of political behaviour, like his theory of capitalist economic behaviour, is ultimately grounded in a theory of individual rationality. His fundamental postulate of political analysis is that:

 

Agents, as members of classes, behave in ways calculated to advance their perceived material interests. These interests are perceived as class interests (i.e. interests shared with other members of the class), and class organisations and features of class consciousness permit classes to overcome implicit conflicts between private interest and class interest.

 

Second, Marx’s theory of political behaviour incorporates the concept of ideology. Ideologies, or “false consciousness”, are systems of ideas that affect the worker’s political behaviour by instilling false beliefs and self-defeating values. An ideology may instil values or preferences that propel individuals to act in ways contrary to their objective material interests. Further, ideologies modify purposive action by instilling false beliefs about the causal properties of the social world and about how existing arrangements affect one’s objective interests. Rational individuals, operating under the grip of an ideology, may take actions contrary to their objective interests, but such actions appear rational given the false beliefs they hold about society and their mistaken assumptions about their real interests and values.

 

An ideology is therefore an effective instrument in shaping political behaviour within a class system; it induces members of exploited classes to refrain from political action directed at overthrowing the class system. For Marx, ideology functions as an instrument of class conflict, permitting a dominant class to manipulate the political behaviour of subordinate classes. It is important to identify the institutions and mechanisms through which ideology is conveyed to a population.

 

A third important component of Marx’s theory of political behaviour is his concept of class consciousness. The term refers to a set of motivations, beliefs, and values distinctive for a given class (peasantry, proletariat, petty bourgeoisie). Marx holds that these motivational factors bind members of a class together and facilitate their collective activities. Class consciousness takes the form of motives such as loyalty to other members of one’s class, solidarity in political struggle, and commitment to a future social order in which the interests of one’s class are better served. Marx describes such a complex of psychological properties and their social foundations in The Eighteenth Brumaire.

 

“A whole superstructure of different and specifically formed feelings, illusions, modes of thought and views of life arises on the basis of the different forms of property, of the social conditions of existence. The whole class creates and forms these out of its material foundations and the corresponding social relations. The single individual, who derives these feelings through tradition and upbringing, may well imagine that they form the real determinants and the starting-point of his activity.”

 

A class is supposed to develop its own conscious identity as a class. Insofar as a structurally defined class fails to acquire such attitudes, Marx denies that it is a class in the full sense at all (a class-for-itself as well as a class-in-itself). Marx does not provide an extensive analysis of the process through which class consciousness emerges, even within capitalism, but he suggests that it develops historically through class struggle. As workers or peasants identify their shared interests and gain experience in defending them collectively, they develop concrete ties within their political groups, which provide motivational resources for future action. Again, we need a sociology of the institutions that contribute to the formation of this feature of social psychology.

 

A central function of class consciousness in Marx’s political theory is to explain the moral capacity of members of exploited classes to join prolonged, risky struggles in defence of their material interests. Class consciousness thus functions as a bridge between individual interests and collective interests in classical Marxist analysis of political behaviour. It gives workers effective motivation to undertake strategies favouring their group interests, and it provides the resources to persist in these strategies even in the face of risk and deprivation.

 

This treatment of class consciousness shows an awareness that political behaviour is often driven by motives richer than a narrow calculus of self-interest. Ralph Miliband’s work in The State in Capitalist Society illustrates this point.

 

Here, then, is a model of political behaviour that can legitimately be attributed to Marx: members of groups form beliefs about their material interests and act intelligently to further them; members of groups form beliefs about their social world that are sometimes seriously misleading (ideologies); and members of groups sometimes gain solidarity and loyalty that enable them to act as a collective (class consciousness). The eventual behaviour of an economic group is the aggregate result of its perceptions of its interests, its mental map of how society works, and the solidarity resources it possesses. It is a materialist theory; it is an agent-centred theory; and it is a theory that invites serious investigation of the processes through which the social psychology of a group is formed.

 

MARX’S VIEW ON CLASS STRUGGLE

Class struggle refers to the tension or antagonism that exists in society due to competing socio-economic interests and desires between people of different classes. It stands at the centre of Marxian political philosophy. In The Communist Manifesto, Marx famously declared: “The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles.” Class struggle, according to him, pushes society from one stage to the next in a dialectical process. In each stage, an ownership class controls the means of production while a lower class provides labour. The inevitable conflict between these two classes drives social change.

Theoretical studies show that Marx understood society’s structure in relation to its major classes, and he identified the struggle between them as the primary mechanism of change. His analysis rejected equilibrium or consensus theories. For Marx, conflict was not a deviation within the social structure, nor were classes simply functional elements that sustained it. Rather, the structure itself was both a product and an arena of class struggle. His was a conflict-based view of modern (nineteenth-century) society.

Class conflict can take many forms. It may appear as direct violence, such as wars fought for resources and cheap labour, or as indirect violence, such as deaths from poverty, starvation, illness, or unsafe working conditions. It may also manifest as coercion, for example, the threat of unemployment or withdrawal of investment, or as ideology, such as books and writings that promote capitalism. Political forms of class conflict exist too—lobbying or bribing leaders for partisan legislation on labour laws, tax codes, tariffs, or consumer regulations. Conflict can be direct, as in a lockout aimed at breaking a labour union, or indirect, such as a slowdown in production by workers protesting low wages or unfair practices.

Marx’s view of class conflict may be understood in six key points:

1. Classes are authority relationships based on property ownership.

2. A class unites individuals with a shared life situation, and thus shared interests.

3. Classes are naturally antagonistic because of these interests.

4. Modern society is defined by the growth of two antagonistic classes whose struggle increasingly dominates all social relations.

5. Political organisation and power are instruments of class struggle, and the ruling ideas of society reflect this struggle.

6. Structural change in society is the consequence of class struggle.

The exclusive criterion for determining class, according to Marx, is ownership or control of the means of production. Those who control production form the bourgeoisie (the exploiters), while those who sell their labour power constitute the proletariat (the exploited). Marx therefore explained classes through two interrelated criteria: a person’s position in the mode of production, and their relations of production that follow from it.

Marx emphasised that class conflict is the true dynamic force of human history. In The Communist Manifesto (1848), Marx and Engels wrote: “The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles.” In capitalism, class differentiation is sharpest, class consciousness is most advanced, and class conflict most acute. Capitalism represents the culmination of the bourgeois epoch, as society increasingly divides into two great hostile camps directly facing each other—the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. For Marx, class is rooted in social relations of production, not merely in patterns of distribution, consumption, or ideology.

When analysing class consciousness, Marxists focus less on individual workers’ opinions and more on broader categories: the sale of labour power and exploitation; the economic struggles and trade unions that arise from this exploitation; the transformation of these economic struggles into organised political struggle for state power; and the theoretical and practical efforts to build revolutionary parties of the working class against counter-revolutionary tendencies within the class itself.

Marx distinguished between the objective existence of a class and the subjective awareness of belonging to it—class consciousness. Division of labour, he argued, is the primary source of historical class formation and antagonism. Through history, no major resentment disappears unless replaced by a new antagonism.

While inequality between rich and poor has existed throughout history, under capitalism it becomes polarised into a direct antagonism between capitalist and proletariat. The emergence of the proletariat has a unique historical role: it is not merely another oppressed group, but the one capable of abolishing all classes and class antagonisms by abolishing itself as a class. In this struggle, the majority proletariat is destined to succeed. As Marx and Engels proclaimed: “Workers of the world unite. You have nothing to lose but your chains. You have a world to win.”

Ultimately, Marx envisaged that the outcome of class struggle would be a classless society—free from exploitation and oppression. In such a society, the state itself would wither away, for once classes no longer exist, the very rationale for the state’s existence would disappear.

 

MARXIAN ECONOMY

 

Marx, in his Das Kapital (also known as Capital), validates Ricardo’s Labour Theory of Value: that labour is the sole source of value in production. He defines it as follows: “the exchange value of a commodity is determined by the quantity of socially necessary labour contained in it.”

 

To begin with, writing on capitalist production, Marx starts with a unit of commodity. He begins: “The wealth of those societies in which the capitalist mode of production prevails presents itself as an immense accumulation of commodities, its unit being a single commodity. Our investigation must, therefore, begin with the analysis of a commodity.”

 

He sees: “A commodity is, in the first place, an object outside us, a thing that by its properties satisfies human wants of some sort or another.” He distinguishes two different properties of a commodity: use value and exchange value.

 

As use values, commodities are, above all, of different qualities, but as exchange values, they are merely different quantities, and consequently, do not contain an atom of use value.

 

It is arguable then: why is a commodity being exchanged if it does not contain any use value?

 

Every commodity which has exchange value must contain use value. A commodity which does not have use value does not contain exchange value.

 

Further, he writes: if we leave out of consideration the use value of commodities, they have only one common property left—that of being products of labour.

 

He knowingly asks us to leave aside consideration of use value in order to reach the conclusion that value is nothing but labour.

 

He says: “A use value, or useful article, therefore, has value only because human labour in the abstract has been embodied or materialised in it.”

 

His argument was proved wrong because he says that any useful things which are available without human labour added do not have any use value. On the contrary, they do contain use value, because they can be used for a human purpose—for example, stones to build a house if available in nature, or sand or natural water from a stream to satisfy human thirst.

 

How, then, is the magnitude of this value to be measured? Marx said: plainly, by the quantity of the value-creating substance, the labour, contained in the article. The quantity of labour, however, is measured by its duration, and labour time in its turn finds its standard in weeks, days, and hours.

 

Marx explains: the introduction of power-looms into England probably reduced by one-half the labour required to weave a given quantity of yarn into cloth. The hand-loom weavers, as a matter of fact, continued to require the same time as before; but for all that, the product of one hour of their labour represented after the change only half an hour’s social labour, and consequently fell to one-half its former value.

 

The question arises here:

 

Does it mean technology impacts negatively?

 

If the answer to the above question is true, then what is the role of the investment in the introduction of power-looms? Will the value of yarn disappear if the power-loom is fully automated, meaning robotic and not requiring any human labour? The answer is, of course, no, because robots themselves contain dead labour of those who own them as an investment.

 

Then, what happens to the Labour Theory of Value: that labour is the sole source of value in production?

 

The sums of money or funds that a capitalist expends in the production of the commodities he himself sells constitute ‘capital,’ of two distinct kinds:

1. Constant capital

1. Variable capital

 

That is, according to Marx, non-productive and productive capital.

 

(a) Constant Capital [Non-Productive Capital]

Marx defines this as: “that part of capital represented by the means of production, the raw materials, auxiliary materials, etc., which does not in the process of production undergo any quantitative alteration of value.” That means the cost of raw materials and the cost of machinery, specifically the costs of interest and depreciation in utilizing that physical capital. These are simply consumed, used up, in the production process, and their congealed labour-values are transmitted to the product being manufactured; but this aspect of capital—this constant capital—does not in itself create or add any value of its own to the product.

 

(b) Variable Capital [Productive Capital]

Marx defines this as: “that part of capital represented by labour power, which both reproduces the equivalent of its own value and also produces an excess, or a surplus-value, which itself varies… This part of capital is continually being transformed from a constant into a variable magnitude.”

 

In other words, variable capital is labour-power pure and simple, or more specifically the funds expended in hiring that labour-power, which is, by the axiom previously stated, the sole source of value. As the sole source of value, this variable capital as labour-power not only transmits its own value (as defined above) but creates an additional value called surplus-value.

 

Marx clearly mentioned that constant capital does not in itself create or add any value of its own to the product, but variable capital creates an additional value called surplus-value.

 

Many capitalist critics have pointed out that Marx assumes that capital owners contribute nothing to the process of production. Similarly, many communists also believe that Marx assumes capitalist profit is generated by surplus value—meaning unpaid wages of workers—so it is nothing but mere theft.

 

ENGELS’S DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM

Engels postulated three laws of dialectics from Hegel’s Science of Logic. He reformulated these principles into the framework of materialist dialectics in his work Dialectics of Nature. These laws are:

 

The law of the unity and conflict of opposites

The law of the passage of quantitative changes into qualitative changes

The law of the negation of the negation

 

The first law, which originates with the ancient Ionian philosopher Heraclitus, was recognised by both Hegel and Lenin as the central feature of a dialectical understanding of reality. It is in this dialectic, grasping oppositions in their unity, or the positive within the negative, that speculative thought finds its essence. The splitting of a single whole and the recognition of its contradictory parts is one of the essential characteristics of dialectics. This is precisely how Hegel presented the matter, and Engels followed in developing it further.

 

The second law, concerning the passage of quantitative changes into qualitative changes, can be traced back to the paradox of the heap discussed by the ancient Greek philosophers, and later explained by Aristotle. Hegel incorporated this insight, which Engels inherited and clarified. One of the main illustrations is the transformation of water: its quantitative changes in temperature eventually reach a threshold where they result in qualitative change—ice, liquid, and steam. Scientists describe such processes as phase transitions. This principle also applies to social phenomena, where quantitative increases, such as population growth, bring about qualitative transformations in social structures. Engels emphasised that this law can be applied not only in natural science but also in processes of social change and class conflict.

 

The third law, the “negation of the negation,” originated with Hegel, though its wider recognition comes through Marx’s use of it in Capital. Marx described the process whereby capitalist private property, itself the negation of feudal property, inevitably produces its own negation. He wrote that the expropriators—the capitalists—would in turn be expropriated, as capitalist production creates the conditions for its own dissolution. This represents the law of the negation of the negation: each stage negates what came before, while preparing the ground for a new form of existence.

 

Engels constantly used the insight that higher forms of existence emerge from and remain rooted in lower forms. The higher level, however, constitutes a new order with its own irreducible laws. Evolutionary advance is not random but governed by laws of development that reflect the basic properties of matter in motion as a whole. Dialectical materialism therefore provides a method for understanding both natural and social change, in which contradiction, transformation, and development are inseparable.

 

LENIN’S DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM

Lenin outlined three key “elements” of logic in his notes, which can be seen as the basis of his understanding of dialectical materialism:

 

The determination of the concept out of itself, meaning that the thing must be considered in its relations and in its development.

The contradictory nature of the thing itself, with opposing forces and tendencies present in every phenomenon.

The union of analysis and synthesis.

 

Lenin developed these points further, arguing that the “transition of quantity into quality and vice versa” is itself an expression of the unity and opposition of opposites. He suggested that development involves not only the unity of opposites but also the transformation of every determination, quality, feature, or property into its opposite.

 

Lenin also stated that “development is the struggle of opposites.” For him, the unity or coincidence of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, and relative. By contrast, the struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and motion themselves are absolute.

 

He explained dialectical materialism through three axes:

(i) the materialist inversion of Hegelian dialectics,

(ii) the historicity of ethical principles ordered to class struggle, and

(iii) the convergence of the “laws of evolution” in physics (Helmholtz), biology (Darwin), and political economy (Marx).

 

Lenin’s philosophical position was therefore located between historicist Marxism (Labriola) and determinist Marxism, a position that some compared to “social Darwinism” (Kautsky). At the same time, discoveries in physics at the end of the 19th century—such as x-rays, electrons, and the beginnings of quantum mechanics—challenged previous conceptions of matter and materialism, making matter appear to be “disappearing.”

 

By this, Lenin meant that the limits within which matter had previously been understood were disappearing, as knowledge penetrated deeper. Properties once considered absolute, immutable, and primary were now revealed to be relative and characteristic only of certain states of matter. For Lenin, the only essential property of matter was its being an objective reality—its existence independent of the human mind.

 

One of Lenin’s challenges was to distinguish materialism, as a viable philosophical outlook, from three inadequate forms: “vulgar materialism,” expressed in the idea that the brain secretes thought in the same way the liver secretes bile (attributed to 18th-century physician Pierre Jean Georges Cabanis); “metaphysical materialism,” which conceived matter as composed of immutable particles; and “mechanical materialism,” which reduced matter to random molecules interacting according to the laws of mechanics. The philosophical solution that Lenin, following Engels, proposed was “dialectical materialism.” In this view, matter is defined as objective reality, consistent with new scientific developments, and dialectics provides the method through which its motion, transformation, and development can be understood.

 

 MAO’S DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM

Mao outlined a version of dialectical materialism that subsumed two of Engels’s three principal laws of dialectics—“the transformation of quantity into quality” and “the negation of the negation”—as sub-laws (and not principal laws in their own right) of the first law, “the unity and interpenetration of opposites.”

 

Mao believed that treating them as separate principal laws had the effect of suppressing political activity. He insisted that dialectical materialism was equally applicable to socialist society as it was to the capitalist phase. In his speech, Mao developed this idea further, pushing for full participation in the process of development as a cultural revolution. For Mao, the notion of continuous revolution meant that the purpose of the Communist Party was not simply to staff an authoritarian bureaucracy, but to enable and guarantee a process of development that connected Marxism to popular aspirations, while opening a path for progressive transformation.

 

At one point Mao even proposed the application of dialectical materialism to the socialist stage in a way similar to the capitalist state. However, his interpretation of dialectical materialism, especially in relation to the Soviet Union and the contradictions between Soviet workers and peasants, was distinctive. Mao stated: “Even under the social conditions existing in the Soviet Union, there is a difference between workers and peasants, and this very difference is a contradiction, although, unlike the contradiction between labour and capital, it will not become intensified into antagonism or assume the form of class struggle. The workers and the peasants have established a firm alliance in the course of socialist construction and are gradually resolving this contradiction in the course of the advance from socialism to communism.”

 

A sharp contradiction, however, is evident in Mao’s own position. On one hand, he spoke of a firm alliance between classes and gradual resolution of contradictions within socialism. On the other, in relation to the development of socialism out of capitalism, he rejected gradualism and emphasised revolution. His famous line makes this clear: “A revolution is not a dinner party, or writing an essay, or painting a picture, or doing embroidery; it cannot be so refined, so leisurely and gentle, so temperate, kind, courteous, restrained and magnanimous. A revolution is an insurrection, an act of violence by which one class overthrows another.”

 

It is also important to note that dialectical materialism is not, and never has been, a programmatic method for solving particular physical problems. Rather, dialectical analysis provides an overview and a set of warnings against dogmatism and narrowness of thought. It reminds us that history may leave an important trace; that being and becoming are dual aspects of nature; that conditions change, and sometimes the very conditions necessary for a process may be destroyed by the process itself. It reminds us to pay attention to real objects in time and space and not to lose them in abstract idealisations. It shows how the qualitative effects of context and interaction may disappear when phenomena are isolated. And above all, it insists that all these warnings are contingent reminders, whose real application depends entirely on the circumstances of the world we are examining.

 

CHARLES DARWIN’S DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM

 

There is no direct evidence that Darwin consciously supported the dialectical method, yet he approached his understanding of the world from a materialist standpoint. In attempting to explain what he perceived in the actual world, he made keen observations of natural phenomena in relation to their surroundings, the processes of their development, and their ultimate transformation. His observations were conducted diligently, across long periods of time and within a wide range of phenomena. Darwin perceived the world in a dialectical manner, and this prompted him to take a bold and informed step that had never been taken before. One striking aspect of Darwin’s interpretation lies in the sheer weight of evidence he managed to gather in substantiating his arguments.

 

One of Darwin’s central arguments is that evolution led to the “survival of the fittest.” This idea gave rise to another concept, the “struggle for existence.” Darwin acknowledged the influence of reading Malthus on human populations, which sharpened his thinking about how selection operates in organisms. To me, it is clear that Darwin never reduced the struggle for existence to competition among people. Rather, he perceived it as the broader struggle of organisms to survive within their environment—this included both the struggle with other species and the struggle against the physical conditions of their surroundings.

 

Engels, while having little regard for Darwin’s acceptance of Malthus, was quick to clarify that Darwin’s theory of natural selection was not dependent on Malthus. Engels emphasised that Darwin’s arguments rested on the evidence he had collected, and that even if Malthus was mistaken, it did not discredit Darwin’s theory.

 

In summary, the interpretations discussed here can often appear conflicting. Yet it may be derived that they all, in some way, half-quoted dialectical materialism as a conflict of opposites, whether unwittingly or deliberately overlooking its essential dimension—the unity of opposites. This recognition, in turn, provides a basis for proposing an alternative interpretation of human societies: the idea of a “Technological Revolution in the Process of Human Evolution.”

 

TECHNOLOGICAL REVOLUTION IN THE PROCESS OF HUMAN “EVOLUTION”

The history of man is full of narratives of struggles, inventions and ultimate transformations. However, the main impetus to human revolution, and therefore evolution, is technology. According to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary, technology is “the application of scientific knowledge for practical purposes”. While it can be argued that there was no science in the prehistoric period, it’s the perception that science is inherent to man. To begin with, the history of tools in the process of exploiting the available natural resources by man.

According to existing evidence, the earliest stone tool making was developed at least 2.6 million years ago. But why tools? The answer to this might be that food resources grew scarce. This could be as a result of droughts and extreme competition. Man, who was exclusively a gatherer of readily available meals such as fruits and leaves, could not come across them. There was intense competition, and man opted for an alternative solution to meals. Then he came across nuts such as almonds, coconuts and others that needed to be broken. It might have been through this that man discovered that stones could be used to crush and get the meal within. Man not only used stone tools to crush nuts but extended their usage to include security.

Currently, the oldest stone tools, referred to as the Oldowan toolkit, are made up of hammerstones, stone cores, and sharp stone flakes. All these tools depict that they were used to crush and pierce. During this prehistoric period of human evolution, those who could efficiently use the stone tools became the ultimate survivors – a superior class of people. Those who could not became the lesser beings.

The exploitation of tools extended from food to protection and hunting, and this is where the discovery of stone tips, arrows and bows come in. According to archaeologists, the stone tips are among the earliest forms of weapons used by early man. It is recorded that the earliest surviving stone tips which have animal blood date back almost 64,000 years ago in Natal, now South Africa. When man learned the use of stones to crush nuts, he realised that they could be exploited further, sharpened, and put at the end of a stick, hence becoming an arrow.

Other discoveries such as fire are also consequential. Meat, which was not easy to eat, was roasted and eaten by man. Man’s capacity to control fire among early humans was indeed a turning point in their history. Fire was advantageous as it provided a source of warmth, protection, a technique for cooking and another improvement in man’s hunting experience.

There is several evidence which is conclusive and dating back to 300,000 years ago, whereby flint blades were found in proximity with fossils. Prehistoric man was a social being, and they lived in groups. However, the discovery of hunting tools and fire served to transform society at large. Those who could effectively utilise the tools and fire emerged as superior. They could fight better, hunt better, and eat better. Those who were not ingenious enough to utilise such discoveries lagged in society and transformed to be dependent on the others. This might have led to a form of social inequality in the prehistoric period.

As human beings went through the process of revolution as a result of their various forms of inventions, the notion of living in a group that has mutual understanding and dependency became practical. This led to the emergence of communities that merged small and initially isolated groups. The conjoined communities emerged into societies that are currently referred to as ancient civilisations. Examples of known ancient civilisations include the Incas Civilisation, the Aztecs Civilisation, the Roman Civilisation, the Persian Civilisation, the Ancient Greek Civilisation, the Chinese Civilisation, the Mayan Civilisation, the Indus Valley Civilisation, the Mesopotamian Civilisation, and the Egyptian Civilisation, among others that might not have been documented or discovered yet.

What makes such ancient civilisations popular to this day, and what might have made them famous and therefore distinct from other societies during their time, is technological advancement. For instance, the Ancient Egyptian Civilisation is popular for its Pyramids that were constructed using advanced technology. The Shaduf method of irrigation ensured that farming was efficient. The civilisation had a high supply of both water and food, which made it unique. Other nearby societies were therefore proved inferior to Egypt as a result of its technological advancement. Up to now, scientists marvel at the wonder of the pyramids and how people during those dark times managed to come up with such sophisticated structures.

Ancient Mesopotamia is also currently perceived as a cradle of human discoveries. The invention of the wheel was in Mesopotamia. It was not used for transportation but rather as potter’s wheels. The wheel was further transformed so it could be used for irrigation, transport, and in pottery making. During such ancient times, the wheel propelled social inequalities. The rich could afford the wheels for transportation. This is quite similar to the current times, when wheels, in the form of cars, can be afforded by well-to-do individuals in society. All in all, such a discovery has highly transformed society. Other inventions in ancient Mesopotamia include the chariot, the sailboat, the plough, time, astronomy and astrology, the map, mathematics, and urban civilisations.

Indeed, civilisations have come and gone, and how they diminished depicts the important role of technology. Man has experienced eras of wars that have wiped out civilisations and led to the emergence of newer civilisations. For instance, in the two world wars fought, the concern was to ascertain superiority. The superiority in this regard is how powerful a nation is as it pertains to the weaponry at its disposal. When the US joined the Second World War, it emerged as a superpower, and this is because of its superior weaponry and fighting technique. This set it apart and created a tension with the Soviet Union during the time, culminating in the emergence of the Cold War. Man has been on the rush to come up with superior weaponry, hence the emergence of increasingly dangerous and sophisticated weapons such as chemical and nuclear weapons.

For instance, what is it that makes the US different from a nation like Uganda in Africa? Is it the people or the technology that is being utilised? America is superior because of its superior weaponry; speak of the nuclear weapons, and nations such as North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Russia, and the UK will emerge. The social tension that exists worldwide is a consequence of the extreme technological advancements. Man’s capacity to ut1ilise technology in the exploitation of his environment is what sets him apart from others who lack that ability. If what we currently refer to as Third World nations were to wholly embrace technology and exploit aspects of their lives such as weaponry, medicine, urbanisation and other prudent aspects, then the form of discrimination that exists in discerning them from “Developing nations”, “Developed nations”, and “Industrialised nations” would not exist.

Industrialisation is a whole new form of social structuring. We categorise nations and places according to the manner in which technology has been embraced. For instance, what is the implication of Silicon Valley? This is where technology is increasingly utilised. Increasingly sophisticated companies are located in Silicon Valley, and as a result, all people, or rather the majority of those who work there, are rich and enjoy the benefits that come with it. Consequently, it is high time we embrace the term “technological revolution in the process of evolution”. Human beings are different as it pertains to the technology they exploit and how they exploit it.

 

Summary and Reflections on Dialectical Materialism, Evolution, and Revolution

Human progress, when studied through the lens of Marx and Engels, is presented primarily as revolutionary. They argued that history advances not in smooth continuity but in leaps, as class antagonisms erupt into transformative change. Yet, when compared with Darwin’s theory of evolution, this framing raises a tension. Evolution suggests gradual adaptation, accumulation, and continuity, whereas Marx’s revolutionary analysis often emphasises rupture. In truth, progress cannot be both simultaneously: it must be understood as either fundamentally evolutionary or fundamentally revolutionary. My own reflection is that revolution does occur, but only as part of a wider evolutionary process. It is gradual, shaped by adaptation, and always carries within it traces of the past — the quantitative becoming qualitative without entirely erasing what came before.

Here lies the difficulty. Marx and Engels drew inspiration from Darwin yet inverted him: where Darwin stressed natural adaptation, they reframed change as revolutionary rupture in human society. Their dialectical materialism, meant to be a scientific method of explaining change, risked overstating rupture over continuity. Later leaders such as Lenin, Stalin, and Mao went further. They politicised this theory, transforming dialectical materialism into a doctrine of class struggle alone. Instead of seeing unity and conflict of opposites as a dynamic whole, they reduced it to antagonism between capitalist and proletariat. The more balanced dialectic of unity and opposition was thus narrowed to perpetual conflict, leaving little room for class collaboration or gradual adaptation.

This led to another distortion: the natural rhythm of evolution — the slow maturation of conditions — was often bypassed. Lenin to Mao sought to force the future into the present, imposing revolution before society had fully ripened for change. What should have been an organic passage of adaptation became a hurried leap, as though history could be accelerated by will alone. In this sense, the revolutionary vision of Marx was politicised, mechanised, and stripped of its flexibility.

Thus, dialectical materialism, originally conceived as a method to explain change scientifically, was reinterpreted, politicised, and mechanised. Its subtle recognition of continuity and rupture, of adaptation and transformation, was reduced to slogans of class war. The result was that Marx’s dialectical method, which might have explained both evolution and revolution in their interplay, became in practice a rigid framework for political struggle. In this process, the richer meaning of dialectics — its openness to time, gradual development, and unity within opposition — was often lost.

Towards a Scientific and Progressive Praxis

Criticism alone is never sufficient. If dialectical materialism, as conceived by Marx and Engels, was meant to explain change scientifically, then we too must ask: what comes next, and how do we prevent repetition of past distortions? The challenge before us is not simply to interpret or criticise but to propose. Why this hustle and bustle? For whom are we striving? Ultimately, it must be for the human being, for society, and for the betterment of life itself. The end goal cannot be abstract power, but human flourishing.

Here we introduce what may be called an Adaptive Dialectical Praxis (ADP) — a method that recognises both the evolutionary rhythm of gradual adaptation and the revolutionary leap when conditions ripen. Unlike Lenin, Stalin, or Mao, who often forced the future into the present without allowing time for organic adaptation, ADP insists on balance. Change must be both scientific and democratic, arising not from mechanical imposition but from concrete analysis of problems, collective participation, and evidence-based thresholds for decisive action.

ADP safeguards against the danger of reversal by building self-correcting mechanisms into its very design. Every transformation must be tested, deliberated, and safeguarded through transparency, accountability, and collective consent. This means policies are not just imposed from above but evolve through stages: diagnosis, pilot, public deliberation, scaling, and audit. Revolutionary shifts are permitted, but only when evidence, feasibility, and human consent converge.

Such an approach also forces us to confront the critical questions often ignored: What is the true end goal of our struggles? What does humanity stand to achieve once progress is attained? And how do we ensure that the gains are not reversed or captured by narrow interests? ADP insists that measures of progress must be rooted in dignity, security, equity, ecological balance, and voice. Institutions must therefore be designed to preserve these gains — through periodic review, public audit, and constitutional safeguards — so that achievements are not undone by future regression.

In this sense, praxis becomes not merely political manoeuvre but a scientific and ethical system, built by people themselves, to fight present problems while safeguarding the future. Progress then is neither blind evolution nor imposed revolution, but a dialectical synthesis: a measured, participatory, and irreversible movement towards a higher stage of human society.

A Concrete Framework: Adaptive Dialectical Praxis (ADP)

If criticism is to have meaning, it must generate constructive direction. Adaptive Dialectical Praxis (ADP) offers such a direction. Unlike past attempts to freeze dialectics into rigid formulas or to rush the future into the present, ADP recognises that human progress is neither purely evolutionary nor purely revolutionary, but a dynamic interaction of both. It calls for a measured, scientific praxis that adapts to conditions while maintaining a transformative horizon.

Core Principles of ADP

1. Concrete Analysis of Problems – Change must begin from reality as it exists, not as ideology wishes it to be. ADP demands a scientific investigation of economic, social, political, and cultural contradictions, with solutions designed for real human needs.

2. Adaptive Transformation – Evolution and revolution are not opposites but phases of the same process. Small, incremental changes must be allowed to mature, but when conditions demand, qualitative leaps should be undertaken—always grounded in preparedness rather than haste.

3. Safeguards Against Regression – Every social advance must carry with it institutions, cultural practices, and mechanisms that prevent reversal into exploitation, oppression, or authoritarianism. Without these safeguards, victories risk being temporary.

4. Human-Centred Goal – The ultimate purpose of praxis is not abstract “progress” but the flourishing of human beings and communities. The economy, politics, and technology must remain tools, not masters, serving the dignity and wellbeing of all.

5. Collective Ownership of the Future – Transformation must be built not by an elite vanguard imposing its vision but by inclusive participation, ensuring that people themselves shape the systems designed to serve them.

The End Goal

ADP envisions a society that adapts continuously without losing direction—a society where conflict is addressed without being absolutised, where progress is safeguarded by structures of accountability, and where humanity’s shared future is secured through both innovation and responsibility. It seeks to harmonise the urgency of change with the patience of evolution, ensuring that when humanity advances, it does not stumble back into old chains.