Brexit: A Better Deal Is Still Possible

By Maq Masi

Ten years after the referendum, the Brexit argument remains stuck. One side treats closer European cooperation as a betrayal of sovereignty. The other regards any defence of Brexit as nostalgia or denial. Both risk overlooking a more useful question.

What did Britain actually want? What did it achieve? And what can it still negotiate without pretending the 2016 referendum never happened?

In my previous article, I examined the economic consequences of Brexit. Here, I want to consider the political choices that remain open to Britain and whether a better relationship with Europe is possible.

What Voters Were Trying to Solve

Immigration and democratic accountability were central concerns behind Brexit. Many voters believed that freedom of movement made it harder to manage housing demand, NHS capacity, school places and public spending. They also questioned why rules affecting Britain could be made through European institutions beyond the direct control of British voters.

These concerns deserve examination, but immigration cannot explain every shortage. Migrants work, pay taxes, establish businesses and staff public services. Housing shortages also reflect planning and construction failures. NHS pressures involve funding, staffing, productivity and an ageing population.

Before the referendum, David Cameron negotiated proposed reforms concerning welfare and free movement. They did not give Britain a general right to impose immigration quotas, and the settlement never took effect.

Leaving the EU was therefore a far-reaching response to concerns that were partly about immigration and domestic governance. Whether further reform within the EU was politically achievable remains uncertain. The more practical question now is what Britain has accomplished with the powers it recovered.

What Brexit Delivered

Britain regained substantial legal control over immigration from the EU. Yet non-EU immigration increased sharply in the following years before falling more recently.

This increase was not the result of one deliberate policy. It reflected several visa routes, labour shortages, international circumstances and successive government decisions. Nevertheless, if voters expected lower overall immigration and less pressure on housing and public services, the initial outcome was very different.

The lesson is important. Sovereignty gives a government the authority to make decisions, but it does not guarantee that those decisions will produce the intended results.

Regulatory and trade independence also returned. These powers have value when they create genuine advantages. Where they merely oblige businesses to comply with two systems, however, independence becomes an additional cost.

A British Chambers of Commerce survey of 989 firms, 96 per cent of them small and medium-sized enterprises, found that 54 per cent of exporters believed the UK-EU Trade and Cooperation Agreement had not helped them increase sales to the EU. Only 16 per cent considered it beneficial.

Such findings do not mean every business has suffered equally, but they demonstrate that formal trade independence and commercial success are different things.

Sovereignty should be judged by what it achieves, not merely by the powers it restores.

What Do the Political Parties Offer?

Labour favours sector-specific agreements with the EU while remaining outside the Single Market and Customs Union. This preserves immigration and trade-policy independence but limits the economic benefits that can be recovered.

The Liberal Democrats favour a much closer relationship, including negotiations towards Single Market participation through the European Economic Area, a customs union and stronger defence cooperation. This could reduce trade barriers, but would involve free movement, common regulations and financial contributions.

The Greens support eventual EU membership, while the SNP advocates EU membership for an independent Scotland. Both prioritise European integration, although Scotland’s constitutional position raises additional questions about its economic relationship with the rest of Britain.

The Conservatives emphasise sovereignty, regulatory autonomy and immigration control. Reform UK places greater emphasis on reducing immigration and restricting access to welfare. Both must explain how their preferred policies would affect labour supply, businesses, tax revenues and public services.

Each party identifies legitimate priorities, but none eliminates the trade-offs.

Greater integration can reduce commercial barriers while requiring shared obligations. Greater independence preserves national choices but can increase the costs of trading with neighbouring markets.

The real question is which arrangement offers the greatest overall benefit at an acceptable economic, political and social cost.

What Was Lost and What Can Be Recovered?

Brexit’s consequences extend beyond national economic statistics.

Small exporters face additional customs, VAT and regulatory procedures. Larger companies can employ specialists or reorganise supply chains. Smaller firms may find that the costs make individual orders unprofitable. In the BCC survey, only four of 946 respondents considered government support for navigating trade-policy changes comprehensive.

Farmers and food producers face inspections, certification requirements and delays when trading with the EU. Negotiations towards a sanitary and phytosanitary agreement offer an opportunity to reduce these barriers, potentially restoring easier trade in products such as fresh sausages, certain shellfish and seed potatoes. The UK government has targeted implementation no later than 2027, although the final terms and timetable remain subject to negotiation.

Students and universities have experienced significant changes. New EU student enrolments fell by approximately 57 per cent in 2023/24 compared with 2020/21, while total EU student numbers declined substantially from their peak. The loss of home-fee eligibility for most new EU students contributed to this change. Universities have consequently lost an important source of students and international academic exchange.

British citizens living or travelling in Europe have also lost rights. Property ownership remains generally possible, subject to national rules, but buying a home does not confer an automatic right to reside there. British visitors are normally limited to 90 days in any rolling 180-day period across the Schengen Area.

The EU’s Entry/Exit System, fully operational since April 2026, electronically records relevant border crossings. Spending an extended season in Europe is no longer possible under ordinary Schengen short-stay rules without obtaining appropriate national permission.

Regional funding has changed rather than simply disappeared. The UK Shared Prosperity Fund replaced elements of European structural funding, but questions remain about whether domestic arrangements provide comparable long-term investment, particularly in economically disadvantaged communities.

Not every loss carries the same economic weight. Some are personal inconveniences; others affect business survival, investment, employment and public revenue. Negotiations should prioritise those problems where the benefits of reform are demonstrable.

A Practical Negotiating Agenda

Britain should begin with agreements that offer clear advantages to both sides.

Food and agricultural cooperation could reduce border inspections, certification costs and delays. The proposed SPS agreement is a practical opportunity, although it would require substantial alignment with relevant EU rules and an agreed system of oversight.

Pharmaceuticals, medical devices and chemicals deserve separate regulatory discussions. Mutual recognition may be possible in particular areas, while cooperation on inspections, technical evidence and regulatory procedures could reduce duplication elsewhere. These possibilities should be examined individually rather than assumed.

Manufacturing and supply chains would benefit from simpler procedures and greater regulatory predictability. However, Britain should not automatically copy every European trade measure. The EU’s additional duties on certain Chinese electric vehicles, for example, illustrate the tension between protecting domestic producers and maintaining affordable choices for consumers.

Energy cooperation could improve electricity trading, renewable investment and security of supply. Fisheries negotiations should balance access to waters, sustainable stocks and competitive access to markets.

Defence cooperation offers another opportunity. The UK-EU Security and Defence Partnership established in May 2025 provides a foundation for closer industrial and strategic cooperation.

But the failure of negotiations over enhanced British participation in the EU’s €150 billion SAFE defence-financing programme in November 2025 demonstrates that shared security interests do not automatically produce agreement on commercial or financial terms.

Finally, Britain should explore reciprocal mobility arrangements for students, researchers, specialist workers and young people.

Temporary, conditional mobility is not the same as unrestricted permanent settlement. Eligibility, duration, healthcare and access to public benefits can be negotiated. Such arrangements could restore valuable opportunities without necessarily reopening the entire freedom-of-movement question.

What Would Britain Have to Give?

The EU cannot be expected to remove barriers without receiving commitments in return.

Regulatory agreements may require alignment with European standards. Research and defence programmes can involve financial contributions. Mobility agreements require reciprocal rights.

A customs union would restrict Britain’s independent tariff policy. EEA participation would involve free movement, common Single Market rules and financial obligations. Full EU membership would require accession negotiations and shared institutional responsibilities.

These are different choices with different consequences.

The SAFE negotiations illustrate the importance of calculating costs. Talks over enhanced British participation reportedly broke down over financial terms, with an initial contribution discussed at more than €6 billion. British companies retain more limited opportunities under third-country participation rules, subject to applicable conditions.

Britain must therefore assess what each concession would purchase. Regulatory alignment may be economically sensible where British exporters already follow EU requirements. Financial contributions may be justified where the resulting benefits exceed their costs.

But neither alignment nor expenditure should be accepted simply as a symbolic gesture towards closer relations.

What Would Europe Gain?

A successful negotiation must also answer the European Union’s concerns.

European exporters would benefit from easier access to British markets. Manufacturers operating across both economies could save compliance costs. Universities, energy providers and defence industries could gain from shared research and investment.

Britain possesses substantial scientific, industrial and military capabilities. These are valuable foundations for cooperation, although they do not guarantee favourable negotiating terms.

The EU must also protect the integrity of its Single Market. Its member states have different interests in agriculture, fisheries, manufacturing, defence and migration.

An agreement acceptable in London must also be politically and economically acceptable to European governments and institutions.

A sustainable relationship cannot be built around benefits for one side alone.

What Are Britain’s Choices?

Arrangement	Potential advantages	Principal limitations
Existing UK-EU agreement	Independent immigration and tariff policy	Customs, regulatory and mobility barriers
Enhanced bilateral agreements	Targeted improvements in agriculture, energy, research, defence and mobility	Partial market access and sector-specific obligations
Customs union	Reduced rules-of-origin friction for goods	Restricted independent tariff policy; other trade barriers remain
EEA participation	Much deeper Single Market access	Free movement, common rules and financial contributions
Full EU membership	Full institutional participation and broad economic and citizenship rights	Accession conditions, budget obligations and shared decision-making

No comparison table can establish the best outcome without examining the actual terms, economic benefits and public costs.

Nevertheless, the alternatives should be evaluated rather than excluded simply because they resemble or depart from the arrangements Britain had before Brexit.

How Should Britain Proceed?

My preference would be to pursue enhanced bilateral agreements first, particularly in agriculture, regulatory cooperation, energy, research and temporary mobility.

These offer opportunities to reduce avoidable economic costs without immediately reopening the wider constitutional questions surrounding freedom of movement and Single Market membership.

But this should be a starting point, not a permanent limit.

If credible evidence demonstrates that a customs union or deeper economic integration would deliver substantially greater benefits, those alternatives deserve serious public consideration.

The government should publish a negotiating programme identifying the expected economic gains, fiscal costs, legal obligations and reciprocal benefits of each proposal. Parliament and the public should be able to examine these commitments before decisions are made.

The 2016 referendum decided that Britain would leave the European Union. It did not determine every future agreement Britain could make with its neighbours. Nor did it relieve British governments of responsibility for using their recovered powers effectively.

Britain should not continue accepting avoidable economic damage merely to demonstrate independence. Equally, it should not pursue closer integration without explaining what obligations would follow and whether they address or recreate the concerns that contributed to Brexit.

The purpose of public policy is not to defend yesterday’s political slogans. It is to improve people’s lives.

A better deal should therefore be judged by its contribution to living standards, public services, business opportunities, scientific progress, energy security and effective democratic government.

The question is no longer whether Britain can reverse the past, but whether it can negotiate a better future.